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Considering the true naiate of lhi~g~ th~"'fo~2~' is a particular 
stage (of consciousness) and ~ :-ttue oi~ nominally 
(samvrtisat); and as such it is '.%t tot be'" specified as 
either different from or identical wIth the cJnsciousness. 
Considering the worldly talk one can say as he likes. It 
is sometimes quite different frbm the consciousness or 
sometimes identical with it.' F;dr, p'eople talk both ways 
of things which are empirically' 'true:\.l They having in view 
the idea ofdtf(~\e.n~ ta,*~Jo;liex4ljt1lple~"the fragrance of the 
sandal" (candanagandha) 'elc. T!le] )de,a. of iqentity is also 
sometimes expressed in this talk: Pitcher is rupa (visible), 
etc.. r: [, .. i": " ~ i < J t : 'I' ... 1) 1" 
t t (, : ! 
Any way,; in qo~h cas~\s,tJae object-condition (alambana) 
has b~en eluci<;lated~s, yxisti.Qg; intern:llly a1d to this effect 
the author says in conclusion: Thus the interior object 
is endowed with two characteristics (image and causality), 
and therefore it is logically deduced [that the con sciousness 
alone is transferred into the (external)' object (visaya):] 
KUE-CHi-! 'COMMENT ON 'ALAMBANA 
The following are the remarks on Alamhana made 
by Ktie-chi while commenting on Vasubandhu's Vimsatikfi. 
In view of the fact that those comments are quite useful 
to understand and appreciate the respective positions ('}f 
the realists whose opinions Dignaga has taken great pains 
to combat in composing his tre:atise, Alambanaparzha. 
There are such three groups of the realists whose thenries 
are set forth by way of Pflrvapak ;7:/ in this treatise. Now 
we are at a loss to specify who are they and which group 
of the realists uphold which type of systenl. The two 
Tikas that are now available in translations (one in Tibe-, {~ .. 
tan and the other in Chinese) are not much of help to 
:'Y'" 
us in this respect. However, Kue-~Wt ,tp.e renowned Chi-
nese commentator, thQugh not writing, 'a regular comment 
tV; ....... 
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on the treatise has shed invaluable light on the problems 
that we are confronting in this context. This is the rea-
son which prompted me to reproduce his observations 
relevant to the problems. With regard to the first proposition, 
1 
viz. the proposition of the atoms-object-view, Kue-chi says :-
2 
1. "This master (i.e. old Sarvastivadin) considers that many 
dharmas (atoms included) in the base of visible, rupa, etc. 
become the object of visual perception. Why is this so? 
Their indivisible atoms (paramaTJu) each substantially exis-
ting (dravyasat), constitute jointly one aTJU or molecule. 
This aTJU is prajflaptisat, phenomenally real and therefore 
not at all subst-antially existing." 
3 
"Five-fold consciousness relies on (iilambate) the subs-
tantially existing dharma as its object and hence it does 
not really rely on alJu. Thus the compound of atoms are 
things which are only conventionally real (projiiaptirupa). 
Therefore, while .the ba~es of the visible, etc. (rupayatanadi), 
become objects of visual perception (cak$ur-vijnana), etc. 
each of the indivisible atoms ( paramcinu ) which are substanti-
ally real, serves their object (ekfl.ikam). Visual consciousness, 
etc. do not rely on (a/fLmbate) the thing which is pheno-
menally real (prajnaptisat) because what is substantially 
existing (dravyasat) can (alone) produce consciousness". 
The above extract shows that Dignaga in the first 
proposition refers to the standpoint of the old Sarvastivadi-
vaibhasikas. 
In regard to the second and the third propositions, 
Kue-chi makes the following observations: 
"The master of the Sutra-sect says: the indivisible atoms 
(paramanu) that are substantially existing are not the object 
of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible atoms 
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are manife.sted there (-five-fold consciousness). These seven 
indivisible (atoms) constitute jointly one anurupa, gross atom. 
1 his gross body of atoms (samha ta-anu) though phenomenally 
true (prajnapti) is the object of five-fold consciousness, beca-
use there this ( gross ) form is reflected. No single substance 
atom can be manifested as ulambana, object-cause. Therefore, 
necessarily, the compound (of atoms, anu) constitute jointly 
one gross phenomenal (form), then only the five-fold 
consciousness takes it as object. Therefore the Sastra 
4 
( -Vimsatika ) says: Multitude of indivisible atoms substantially 
existing constitute the objects in their combined form. 
This, the master of Nyaya (~eo-Sarvastivadin) considers 
to be contradictory to his tenets (Sva-paksa-viruddha); he 
maintains that five-fold consciousness of the eye, etc. does 
not rely on (alambate) conventionally real thing. This disti-
nguishes him from the Sutra-sect (Sautrantika). If we follow 
the old (school) (i.e. old Sarvastivadin), then there will be 
4a 
such logical fallacy (as has been pointed out) by Dinna 
(-Dignaga) of no alambana, object-cause, because no form of 
indivisible atoms is reflected in the five-fold consciousness. And 
further (the Neo-Sarvasti-Vadin) says: the material elements, 
etc.(rftpadayo dharmiih) have each of them many a form (akara). 
Out of these only one part (bhaga) becomes the object 
of perception. Therefore, indivisible atoms, being in co-
operation with one another (paraspara-sllpeksa ) assume each 
an integrated form (Sancitakara). This form exists in substan-
ce and produces the consciousness which resembles 
that fbrm and hence becomes the object-cause (alambana-
pratyaya) of the five-fold consciousness. A great number 
of atoms, for example, become integrated to form a 
mountain, etc. and by mutual assistance each of atomS 
assumes the dimension of the mountain, etc. (parvatadi-
pramaT)a-lak$atJa). While visual I consciousness etc. rely on 
(alambate) , the mountain, etc. the number of atoms existing 
substantially and being in co-operation with one another 
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become (one) mountain so that five-fold consciousness could 
t be brought into play. Hence they constitute alambana, 
object-cause. In such a case there will be no fallacy involving 
absence of alambana, because what exists substantially is 
accepted as alambana. Therefore, the sastra (Vimsatika.) says 
that substantially existing number of atoms all get integrated. 
This is explained in detail in the Alambanapariksa of Dinna 
and the \iijnaptimatrata - siddhi-Sastra, Chuan. 1. 
"In the old Vijnaptimatrata (treatise) the tenets of the 
ping-shin-shih (-Vaisesika) and the old Sa-pa-to. (-Sarvastiva-
din) only are stated. The Sanghata and Sancita are said 
to be one, viz. paramanu-Samudaya-rupa, a matter constituted 
of indivisible atoms. This is hardly intelligible and the 
statement is difficult to explain H (vf.4e.L.l-f.Sa,1.6) 
On another occasion Kue-chi makes the following 
comments: "The Sutra-sect and others (hold) that the 
indivisible atom (param l1 nu) being in the nature of one 
single substance (ekadravya-rupa) becomes the object of 
5 
non-sensuous consciousness (mano-vijnana) alone. The Sar-
vastivadins (Sa-po-to), etc. also hold that each of the ten 
bases (avatrma) includes this single atom which becomes 
perceptible by the consciousness relevant to it. Thus one 
indivisible substance-atom (dravya-paramanu) ha<; been 
accepted by you (Sarvastivadin, etc). But I (Vijnanavadin) 
do not accept that it is (so); because there is no logic in 
your argument. Therefore it is stated (by the Vijnanavadins) 
that indivisible atoms be in their combination form (Sang-
hata, ho-ho ) or integration form (Sancita-ho-chi) artha, would, 
in all cases, be contradictory to pramar}a (i.e. perceptual 
experience). So the Alambanaparlk~a criticises the masters 
of the Sutra-sect in this way: The compound (Sanghata) 
of riipa, etc. because it is experienced in the visual consci-
ousness and because it is revealed to the consciousness 
in the gross, behaves as alambana object, it nevertheless, is 
not a causal factor (pratyayarlha). because it is not a 
real substance (adravyarupa). For example, ( a man of) 
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disturbed' eye~sight set'S a double m()OIl. That being a non-
substantial image it cannot constitute the cause of that 
consciousness. Then the treatise establi~;hes the syllogism 
(pramiiTJa) that 'the comround of atom (ho-ho-sanghiili), though 
it is alambana is not a pratyaya (cause) because it does 
, " not "exist in substance. It is, like the second moon. 
"I . Ihe treatise of the Vijnaptimatrata-Siddhi criticises that 
. theory thus : compounds (Sanghiita-lak~a1)a) isolated from 
the indivisible atom; CJ.n.1Jt exist in substance. With the 
renlOval of the parts of a cOl11pound, one' by one, the 
consciousness, of that gross form invariably disappears. 
Hence the compound as such ceases to exist in substance 
. and can no longer, be stated to be the cause of five-fold 
consciousness in the same manner as the second moon. 
(The idea of indivisible atoms) is even more inconceivable: 
If indivisible atoms exist in substance, it would follow that 
compounds, exist. conventionally. (If) what constitute Ihe 
whdle do 'ribt exist in substance, the constituted whole can-
not be established . 
. The AlaII1banaparjk~a criticises the masters of Nyaya 
(Neo-Sarvastivadins) thus: Just as solidity, etc. (Kaihinatiidi-
Lak~aTJa) though existing in substance. may be reckoned as 
cause (prat};ayiirtha) they cannot be iilambana, the objects 
(of consciousness), because that form does not exist in 
visual consciousness. etc. The same wi1l be 10gicaIJy the 
case with the integr~ted form (Saneita = ho-chi-hsing) of 
the indivisible atoms of riipa, etc. because that form 
(Sancitiikiira) is regarded as no other than the form of 
indivisible atoms. Then the tr~atise establishes this syllogism: 
The integrated form ( Saneitiikiira) of indivisible atoms 
though it is the cause (pratyaya) of the consciousness of 
eye, etc. cannot be its object (iilambana), because it is reckoned 
to be atomic form itself in the same way as solidity, 
flu.istjty~, etc,~, (Kiithinya~Silehlidi). But we experience (grh) 
, '-, ' ~ , 
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the consciousness of the eye, etc. taking as their objects 
the integrated form of atoms. Furthermore we have· qis~ 
tinct cognitions of the pot, buw1, etc. Th.~,se cognitions 
would bf'come valme and indistinct; for; no distinction 
(in cognition) is ad~issible on the basfs of distinction in 
their respective forms. (The cognition of distinct fotms is , 
unreal) because the distinct forms are non-entities (adravya). 
The indivisible atoms too .cannot have distirlct form of 
their O\Vll. Why b this so? Because the indivisible atoms 
are of equal dimension (paramandalya). The distinction 
in forms exi~ts only in phenomena, (prajnapti). When it is 
broken up into indivisible atoms the cognition (of distinct 
form) eisappears invariably. 
The Vijnaptimatrata-Siddhi-Sastra moreover states: The 
comprehension of that (integrated form) is not possible, 
because while in the process of unification (Sancitavastha) 
the atoms are essentially the same as at the time when they 
were simple and non-unWed. The individual atoms of the 
pot, bowl, etc. being equal (in their dimension) consciousness 
relying on these things (Iallaksanam praLUya, i.e. the atoms 
of pot, bowl, etc.) would be identical. Every indivisible 
[;fom at the stage of being unified would each forsake its 
utomic dimension (Parimandalya). So cognition of the object 
in its gross form cannot be derived from the object 
in its subtle form; because cognition of one object 
cannot re based on another. [If you do not accept 
lHs axiom] a singJe consciousness would be capable of 
comprehending (aiambata) the entire world of objects." 
(Vol. III, f. 7b 1.3-f.3b,I.7). 
The foregoing two excerpts would definitely prove that 
t1~e opinions that were cited by Dignaga as the second and 
the third propositions are those of the Sautrantika (i.e. 
~utra-scct) and the Neo-Sarvastivadin (i.e. Nyaya-master) 
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respectively. It is well-known ithat both these schools 
6 
ar~ staunch advocates of the atomic theory of matter. 
Tille ,fundamental difference between them is that while the: 
SarvUSlivttdin regarded the indivisible atom as the direct 
otjc,{;t ·.of our e;xperiencethe .Sautrantika assigned such 
position jothe compo.und or atoms, the indivisible atom 
~ing Cf)gni~a;blt.; (~ccprdiI}g to. him) by.non-sensuous consci-
ou,snpss\€muuo-¥ijnana).( v. Vc1.iii.f.20a 1,7.-f. 20b, 1.1). For 
the. Mui:ut),anjst even the indivisible atoms are conventionally 
1:eal and included in the DhnrmllyattJna (12th. of 12 bases 
of dharmas.eIemel1ts uf existence). The Mahayanist further 
maintains that only great things can disintegrate into 
small parti(;les (.::alled utoms); but the converse is not true 
i.,e .. srnaU lpadicles c~l1n.otconlbint~ to. J;,Olutitute~gr;}at things 
(Ibid . .f .. 20b,. 1l.I;J •. ) 
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